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ARTICLE
SCHOOL CHOICE TO ACHIEVE
DESEGREGATION
Goodwin Liu* and William L. Taylor**
INTRODUCTION
Today, in the wake of the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of
Education,1 it seems appropriate to revisit the meaning and impact of that
historic decision. In our view, Brown was not grounded in legal concerns
about educational quality but rather in the inability of the legalized caste
system imposed by segregation laws to withstand honest scrutiny under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 2 Yet the United States Supreme Court found it
instructive to articulate the importance of public education in a democratic
society and the harm done by inequality. So the Court spoke of education
as
required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him
to adjust normally to his environment. 3
At the beginning of a new century, with the legalized caste system
largely a relic of the past, there is ample evidence that society has made
significant strides toward achieving the lofty educational goals set forth in
Brown. On average, black Americans have many more years of educational
attainment than they did in the 1950s.4 They are found in greater numbers
* Assistant Professor of Law, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley.
** Chair, Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights, and Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown
University Law Center.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 Yale L.J.
421 (1960). The Brown opinion cited Strauder v. West Virginia, which said that the words
of the Fourteenth Amendment gave "to the colored race the right to exemption from
unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored,--exemption from legal
discriminations ... which are steps towards reducing them to the condition of a subject
race." 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880).
3. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
4. In 1965, only 15.2% of African-Americans between the ages of twenty-five and
twenty-nine had attended college; by 1995, that number had risen to 44.9%. Among
African-Americans in that age bracket, 15.3% had completed four or more years of college
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and proportions in the ranks of skilled workers, professionals, and business
people. They are in leadership positions in the armed forces. They register
and vote in much larger numbers than they did decades ago, and they have
become elected officials in localities, state legislatures, and Congress.
Of course, not all of the gains are attributable directly to school
desegregation. Many stem from the civil rights revolution for which Brown
was the catalyst, including the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, and the voting and community empowerment campaigns that
followed across the land. But desegregated schools have played an
important role because they prepared people for higher education,
productive employment, and civic participation. Indeed, a fair accounting
of the experience with school desegregation over the past half century
shows that, where it has been seriously and intelligently pursued, it has
made an important contribution to the educational advancement of African-
American children. 5
Why, then, do we face such enormous problems in public education, with
hundreds of thousands of children of color and poor children attending low-
quality schools that do not prepare them to be productive workers or
citizens? The broad answer, to paraphrase G.K. Chesterton's observation
about Christianity, is not that desegregation has been tried and found
wanting, but that in many places it has been found difficult and not tried at
all. The major obstacle has been the continued link between school
attendance and place of residence. Racial isolation in housing has been far
more resistant to change than many people suspected when the fair housing
laws were enacted, 6 and the barriers posed by residential segregation have
been exacerbated by the sanctification of "local control" by a 5-4 majority
of the Supreme Court in the Milliken v. Bradley decision in 1974. 7 With
that decision, enclaves of affluent white families in suburban school
districts obtained near immunity from the reach of school desegregation,
even when such remedies were logistically feasible and necessary to correct
a racial wrong.8
in 1995, compared to 6.8% in 1965. See James T. Patterson, Brown v. Board of Education:
A Civil Rights Milestone and Its Troubled Legacy 230 (2001) (citation omitted). In the
1990s, college enrollment by students of color increased by nearly 50%. See William B.
Harvey, Am. Council on Educ., Minorities in Higher Education 2001-2002: Nineteenth
Annual Status Report 2 (2002).
5. See infra Part I. For a contrasting view, see David Armor, Forced Justice (1994).
6. See Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and
the Making of the Underclass 115-16 (1993).
7. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
8. The Milliken decision limited the legal availability of interdistrict school
desegregation remedies to situations where plaintiffs could prove that "there has been a
constitutional violation within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in
another district." Id. at 745. In only a few places have these conditions been met in litigation
since 1974. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d
404 (8th Cir. 1985); Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1302-09 (8th Cir. 1984) (St. Louis);
United States v. Bd. of Sch. Comm'rs, 637 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1980) (Indianapolis); Evans
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However badly reasoned, Milliken seems firmly embedded in the law.
Moreover, the prospects for meaningful progress in breaking down patterns
for residential segregation, undergirded as they are in many places by
exclusionary zoning, are long-range at best. This means that, if extending
the gains of school desegregation to many who are now locked in racially
isolated, high-poverty schools is regarded as an important societal goal, we
must find ways to decouple school access from neighborhoods and local
political control.
That has led us to a consideration of whether school choice in some form
may be a useful tool in providing poor families of color access to better
education. We approach the issue warily because the concept of choice has
a checkered history as a civil rights remedy. 9 During the 1960s, when more
direct forms of resistance to desegregation began to falter, Southern states
trotted out the idea of freedom of choice as a preferred remedy. The
problem was that freedom of choice was adopted within the existing
superstructure of segregation, which had been mandatory for many years.
Unsurprisingly, whites chose almost exclusively to attend the segregated
schools they had been attending, and blacks who thought about choosing a
formerly white school for their children often faced the prospect of white
hostility, economic and physical retaliation, and harassment. If they made
no choice, they were assigned to the previously segregated schools. The
Supreme Court all but invalidated "freedom of choice" in 1968, holding in
Green v. County School Board that it could not be used unless it was
demonstrated to be effective in achieving desegregation. ' 0
Magnet schools, a more recent instrument of public school choice that
proliferated in the 1970s and 1980s, have had a more benign history.
Magnets were designed to decrease resistance to desegregation by giving
parents a variety of educational options offered in a desegregated context.11
In general, magnet schools have worked fairly well to achieve their
objective. White parents, eager to gain access to a public school
Montessori program or a language or science program in the early grades,
have enrolled their children in desegregated schools, even some located in
v. Buchanan, 582 F.2d 750, 764-65 (3d Cir. 1978) (Wilmington); Newburg Area Council,
Inc. v. Bd. of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974) (Louisville).
9. Cf James Forman, Jr., The Secret History of School Choice: How Progressives Got
There First, 93 Geo. L.J. (forthcoming 2005) (acknowledging the troubled history of school
choice, but arguing that choice has deep roots in the civil rights movement that progressive
advocates should reclaim).
10. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439-41 (1968). The Court cited a U.S.
Commission on Civil Rights report documenting the adverse consequences that black
citizens faced if they exercised choice for desegregation. See id. at 440 n.5. Not wishing to
set off a new lengthy round of fact-based litigation fourteen years after Brown, the Court
preferred to use a test of efficacy. See id. at 439 (requiring school districts under obligation
to desegregate to "come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work, and
promises realistically to work now").
11. See Who Chooses? Who Loses? Culture, Institutions, and the Unequal Effects of
School Choice 5-6 (Bruce Fuller et al. eds., 1995); Christine H. Rossell, Whatever Happened
to Magnet Schools? No Longer Famous but Still Intact, Educ. Next, Spring 2005, at 44.
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inner cities. 12 And magnets have often vested more authority in talented
principals, enabling them to assemble their own staffs and provide more
drive and energy to schools. But in many cases, magnet opportunities have
done little to ameliorate socioeconomic isolation, 13 and often more money
is spent on magnets than on regular schools, a gap which, if unchecked, can
create a new kind of two-tiered system. 14 Finally, affluent white parents
who believe their children are entitled to unfettered choice have brought
lawsuits challenging the racial balance guidelines of magnet programs in
some communities. 15 Some courts have granted relief,16 although the
recent Supreme Court decision upholding limited race-conscious
affirmative action in university admissions may cast doubt on these
claims. 17
A similar motivation underlies the even more recent development of
charter schools, which at least theoretically are public schools in which
operational discretion has been given to the school organizers in return for
accountability for results. But the definition of charter schools and the
ground rules under which they operate vary from state to state. In some
jurisdictions, loose monitoring of charters has enabled unscrupulous school
operators to commit significant fraud. 18 And in others, the accountability
demands placed on charters require less than is asked of regular public
schools under the No Child Left Behind Act ("NCLB"). 19 In many
districts, the superintendent and staff do not regard charters as public
schools, which means that positive experiences are unlikely to be replicated.
Finally, few jurisdictions require racial or socioeconomic desegregation,
creating the possibility that charters will serve as refuges for white flight. 20
12. See Citizens' Comm'n on Civil Rights, Difficult Choices: Do Magnet Schools Serve
Children in Need? 63 (1997), available at http://www.cccr.org/images/magnet.pdf
[hereinafter Difficult Choices].
13. See id. at 27.
14. See id. at 29.
15. See generally John Charles Boger, Willful Colorblindness: The New Racial Piety
and the Resegregation of Public Schools, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 1719 (2000).
16. See, e.g., Cavalier v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 403 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2005); Hampton
v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 102 F. Supp. 2d 358 (W.D. Ky. 2000).
17. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); cf Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, No. 01-35450, 2005 WL 2679585 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 2005) (relying
on Grutter to uphold a race-conscious desegregation plan voluntarily adopted by a local
school district); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc) (same).
18. See, e.g., Kimberly Miller, As Charters Mushroom, So Do Pleas for Controls, Palm
Beach Post, Sept. 3, 2005, at IC; Harvey Rice, 3 Sentenced in Charter School Scam;
Relatives Get Prison Terms for Bilking State and U.S. of $6 Million, Houston Chron., Sept.
3, 2005, at B9.
19. Cf Paul T. Hill et al., A Study of Charter School Accountability, at ix (2001) ("[Iln
many localities the implicit bargain in a charter school's relationship with government-
performance accountability in return for freedom from detailed rules about procedure and
compliance-still remains an unrealized aspiration.").
20. See Amy Stuart Wells et al., Charter Schools and Racial and Social Class
Segregation: Yet Another Sorting Machine?, in A Nation at Risk: Preserving Public
Education as an Engine for Social Mobility 169, 215 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2000).
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One other choice mechanism that has the potential to aid desegregation is
a provision in the NCLB that establishes a right for parents of children who
attend schools in need of improvement to transfer their children to better
performing schools.2 ' The provision makes no mention of race. But since
many low-performing schools are high-poverty and racially isolated, many
of the students eligible to transfer will be children of color, and at least
some of the transferee schools will have significant numbers of white
children. Transfers are mandatory, however, only within school districts.
The statute gives only weak encouragement to adjoining school districts in
metropolitan areas to make cooperative arrangements with city districts that
lack an adequate number of higher performing schools for effective
choice. 22 The NCLB transfer requirement took effect in 2002 with a
notable lack of enthusiasm from school superintendents. It is still too early
to tell how effective it will be.23
None of the foregoing is intended to suggest that choice cannot be made
to work for laudable educational purposes. But experience does instruct
that, even when the aims are highly desirable, the mechanisms for their
achievement must be carefully examined to ensure the best prospects for
success. With these cautionary thoughts in mind, we argue here that school
choice can and should be used to promote desegregation.
Part I of this Article reviews why desegregation remains a critical policy
goal, and Part II discusses the limitations of existing choice policies with
respect to that goal. In Part III, we propose two desegregative school
choice policies. One seeks to encourage racial and socioeconomic diversity
in charter schools; the other proposes the targeted use of vouchers to enable
disadvantaged urban children to choose not only private schools but also
middle-class suburban public schools. In elaborating these proposals, we
consider three important concerns in Part IV: whether an expansion of
vouchers provides a wedge for ultimately replacing public schools with
market-based alternatives; whether "skimming" effects justify skepticism
21. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 6316(b)(1)(E) (West 2005).
22. See id. § 6316(b)(1 1); see also infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
23. In May 2004, the Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights published a report on
implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act ("NCLB") transfer provision. See Cynthia
G. Brown, Citizens' Comm'n on Civil Rights, Choosing Better Schools: A Report on
Student Transfers Under the No Child Left Behind Act (2004), available at
http://www.cccr.org/ChoosingBetterSchools.pdf. With data from ten states and sixty-eight
districts, the report found that almost 70,000 students exercised choice in the 2003-2004
school year. Id. at 44. In some places, participation in the program was limited by the failure
of districts to disseminate information to parents, by lack of capacity to receive transferring
students, and by other factors not related to parental or student interest. Id. at 66-71; see also
Jimmy Kim & Gail L. Sunderman, Does NCLB Provide Good Choices for Students in Low-
Performing Schools? (2004) (finding that the NCLB transfer provision is not widely used,
does not provide low-income students with better schooling opportunities, and is unworkable
in urban districts with many low-performing schools), available at,
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/esea/good-choices.pdf; William L.
Taylor, Title I As an Instrument for Achieving Desegregation and Equal Educational
Opportunity, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1751 (2003).
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toward choice policies; and whether expanded school choice undermines
the role of public schools as a "balance wheel" for our democracy.
Answering these objections, we conclude that school choice, when carefully
designed and properly implemented, can play an important role in
advancing the goal of equality stated in Brown over fifty years ago.
I. WHY DESEGREGATION WORKS
In Brown, the Supreme Court cited social science evidence to support the
proposition that segregation of minority schoolchildren "generates a feeling
of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts
and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."'24 While the evidence cited
in the opinion and the Court's reliance on it have been abundantly
criticized, few commentators have seriously disputed that state-imposed
segregation stigmatizes and retards the educational progress of black
children, and a growing body of research has supported the efficacy of
desegregation remedies in preventing or undoing the harm.
A good part of the research has to do with academic gains associated
with desegregation. At the macro level, the gap between white and black
students in reading as measured by the widely respected National
Assessment of Educational Progress was reduced roughly by half in the
1970s and 1980s. 25 The greatest gains were recorded by black elementary
students in the Southeast in the 1970s, the period when school
desegregation was occurring all across the region for the first time. 26 This
indication of a positive link between desegregation and achievement is
reinforced by studies of particular communities that have undergone
desegregation. A review by Rita Mahard and Robert Crain of ninety-three
research studies during the 1970s and 1980s concluded that desegregation
does enhance minority achievement for black students. 27 While debate
persists about the significance of gains and the conditions under which they
occur, there is substantial evidence that desegregation can be an
educationally effective approach.
The gains that have been made through desegregation are seen in
measures other than standardized achievement tests. In St. Louis, site of the
largest voluntary interdistrict school desegregation program in the nation,
around 12,000 African-American children who live in the city have
attended public schools in sixteen suburban districts on a voluntary basis
each year. Although a high proportion of the transferring students come
24. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
25. See Marshall S. Smith & Jennifer O'Day, Educational Equality: 1966 and Now, in
Spheres of Justice in Education: The 1990 American Education Finance Association
Yearbook 53, 80 (Deborah A. Verstegen & James Gordon Ward eds., 1991).
26. Nat'l Assessment of Educ. Progress, Three National Assessments of Reading:
Changes in Performance, 1970-1980, at 42-44 (1981).
27. Rita E. Mahard & Robert L. Crain, Research on Minority Achievement in
Desegregated Schools, in The Consequences of School Desegregation 103 (Christine H.
Rossell & Willis D. Hawley eds., 1983).
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from poor families, these students graduate from high school at more than
twice the rate of their city peers, and are much more likely to go on to
college. 28  Other research confirms that black children educated in
desegregated schools are more likely to attend and graduate from college
and earn higher grades in college than black children from segregated
schools. 29
The benefits of desegregation also appear to persist in later life
endeavors. Researchers who have examined longitudinal data find that
graduates of desegregated schools generally held higher status jobs and
earned higher incomes than their counterparts from segregated schools. 30
In addition, school desegregation leads students, both black and white, to
attend college, work, and live in desegregated settings and to have more
interracial interaction later in life-an important attribute for success in our
increasingly diverse society.31
Given the close linkage between severe poverty and racial isolation in
inner-city schools today, the benefits of desegregation are further supported
by two congressionally mandated studies. The 1966 Coleman Report, a
landmark study of 600,000 children commissioned by the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, concluded that disadvantaged children fare better in classrooms
comprised largely of advantaged students than in predominantly
disadvantaged settings, noting "peer influence" as one of the factors. 32 A
more recent study, the Prospects report, found that economically
disadvantaged students scored far lower on tests when they attended
schools with high concentrations of poverty (almost all of which were
racially isolated) than when they were in mixed-income schools. 33
What explains the difference in racially isolated schools and those that
are desegregated? Research and practical experience suggest several key
28. Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain, Stepping over the Color Line: African-
American Students in White Suburban Schools 182 (1997).
29. Jomills Henry Braddock II, Robert L. Crain & James M. McPartland, A Long-Term
View of School Desegregation: Some Recent Studies of Graduates as Adults, Phi Delta
Kappan, Dec. 1984, at 259, 263 (collecting studies).
30. See Michael A. Boozer, Alan B. Krueger & Shari Wolkon, Race and School Quality
Since Brown v. Board of Education, in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity,
Microeconomics 269, 303-06 (1992); Marvin P. Dawkins & Jomills Henry Braddock II, The
Continuing Significance of Desegregation: School Racial Composition and African
American Inclusion in American Society, 63 J. Negro Educ. 394, 401-02 (1994); Jeff
Grogger, Does School Quality Explain the Recent Black/White Wage Trend?, 14 J. Lab.
Econ. 231, 240-42 (1996).
31. See Boozer, Krueger & Wolkon, supra note 30, at 303-05; Dawkins & Braddock,
supra note 30, at 396-400, 402-03 (collecting studies); Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain,
Perpetuation Theory and the Long-Term Effects of School Desegregation, 64 Rev. Educ.
Res. 531 (1994); Braddock, Crain & McPartland, supra note 29.
32. James S. Coleman et al., Office of Educ., U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare,
Equality of Educational Opportunity 21-33 (1966); see also On Equality of Educational
Opportunity 142-43 (Frederick Mosteller & Daniel P. Moynihan eds., 1972); U.S. Comm'n
on Civil Rights, Racial Isolation in the Public Schools 73-124 (1967).
33. U.S. Dep't of Educ., National Assessment of the Chapter 1 Program: The Interim
Report 27-31 (1992).
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factors: high expectations and standards, ample resources, good teaching,
and accountability.
Middle-class schools are often set in communities where almost
everyone-parents, teachers, and students themselves-have high
expectations for success.34 The question for most students in such schools
is not whether they will have a chance to go to college, but which college
they will attend. With high expectations come high standards. The norms
set for student achievement are high, and shoddy work will not pass muster.
Disadvantaged students placed in these settings also learn nonacademic
lessons in how to "negotiate the system" and to succeed in American
society.
Along with high standards and expectations, middle-class schools usually
command ample resources--curricular materials, smaller class sizes, and,
most important of all, good teachers. 35 This is in part the result of the
continued reliance of the public education system on the wealth of local
jurisdictions as the primary means of finance. 36 It is also the result of
seniority rules that allow the most experienced teachers to avoid being
assigned to high-poverty schools. 37
Further, middle-class parents and communities demand accountability
from their public schools. If a principal or teacher is not measuring up,
parents and community leaders will demand her replacement, and they have
the clout to see that their demands are met. Indeed, if a school system is not
responsive, many parents have the means to send their children elsewhere.
These factors likely account for Mahard and Crain's finding that black
children achieve the most substantial gains from desegregation when they
participate in metropolitan or county-wide plans-plans that ordinarily
achieve substantial desegregation across socioeconomic as well as racial
lines.38 The potential benefits may be negated if desegregation does not
begin in the early grades or if rigid ability grouping resegregates
classrooms. 39 But in plans that are well designed and well implemented, a
34. See Mahard & Crain, supra note 27, at 105, 122-23.
35. For literature on the importance of these school inputs, see David Grissmer et al.,
Improving Student Achievement: What State NAEP Test Scores Tell Us (2000); Ronald F.
Ferguson & Helen F. Ladd, How and Why Money Matters: An Analysis ofAlabama Schools,
in Holding Schools Accountable: Performance-Based Reform in Education 265 (Helen F.
Ladd ed., 1996); Jeremy D. Finn & Charles M. Achilles, Tennessee's Class Size Study:
Findings, Implications, Misconceptions, 21 Educ. Eval. & Pol'y Analysis 97 (1999); Larry
V. Hedges, Richard D. Laine & Rob Greenwald, Does Money Matter? A Meta-Analysis of
Studies of the Effects of Differential School Inputs on Student Outcomes, 23 Educ.
Researcher 5 (1994).
36. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36-37 (1973)
(upholding a property tax-based system of school finance against an equal protection
challenge).
37. See Marguerite Roza & Paul T. Hill, How Within-District Spending Inequities Help
Some Schools to Fail, in Brooking Papers on Education Policy 201, 204 (Diane Ravitch ed.,
2004).
38. See Mahard & Crain, supra note 27, at 117-19.
39. See id at 109-13, 120.
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positive environment for learning for poor children and children of color
often develops.
In contrast to the attributes of these suburban schools, racially and socio-
economically isolated schools typically lack the assets that contribute to the
effectiveness of middle-class schools. Often they function in an
environment overwhelmed by a host of social problems that affect children.
Many teachers simply assume that most of their children cannot learn at
high levels. Low expectations lead to low standards. Given the way many
school finance systems work, schools with poor children often lack critical
resources. Well-qualified teachers either do not come or do not stay. And
while many parents want the best education for their children, they lack the
clout to hold the system accountable for poor teaching or overcrowded
classrooms.
School reform legislation at the federal and state levels is designed to
address some of the problems in high-poverty schools-by establishing
high standards, calling for highly qualified teachers, and setting rules of
accountability. And some progress has occurred in states and communities
that have made a determined effort.40 The trouble is that many institutional
practices seem intractable. Some teacher organizations refuse to support
reforms that make teaching at the most challenging high-poverty schools an
attractive option and part of what it means to reach the pinnacle of the
profession.4 1  Teaching thus remains unlike other professions, such as
medicine, where succeeding at the most complex and difficult work often
brings the greatest rewards. Similarly, most political leaders have refused
to take the steps necessary-including tax increases-to attract high-quality
teachers and provide professional development for them. And somehow,
despite efforts to hold teachers and education authorities responsible for
student progress, students themselves often wind up as the first targets of
accountability systems by being classified as "low ability" or held back
while substandard teachers remain in place. 42
Reform must continue and must be intensified and better financed if it is
to help the very large numbers of children in racially isolated, high-poverty
schools. But experience suggests that it would be foolish from an
40. See Citizens' Comm'n on Civil Rights, Title I in Midstream: The Fight to Improve
Schools for Poor Kids 121-33 (1999), available at
http://www.cccr.org/images/midstream.pdf; David Grissmer & Ann Flanagan, RAND,
Exploring Rapid Achievement Gains in North Carolina and Texas (1998).
41. See Richard Rothstein, Getting Good Teachers for Poor Schools, N.Y. Times, Sept.
20, 2000, at B9 (discussing teacher unions' opposition to salary and seniority reforms).
However, not all teacher organizations oppose such measures. See Diane Jean Schemo,
When Students' Gains Help Teachers' Bottom Line, N.Y. Times, May 9, 2004, at Al
(reporting Denver teacher union's support for a reformed salary structure that, among other
things, rewards teachers for working in high-poverty schools).
42. One example of this tendency is the rise of high-stakes testing with minimal
commitment of resources to enable all students to pass the tests. See Ctr. on Educ. Policy,
State High School Exit Exams: Put to the Test 13 (2003) ("States should stop treating exit
exams as if they are a low-cost or no-cost solution to educational problems.").
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educational standpoint to abandon the quest for desegregation. That is what
leads us to consider choice remedies to break the stranglehold that
residential segregation and local control have had on efforts to make
schools more diverse.
II. EXISTING CHOICE MECHANISMS
During the 1960s, meaningful choice for black children in the South
often meant the ability to choose a neighborhood public school that
previously admitted whites only. As the Supreme Court recognized in
Green v. County School Board,43 counties like New Kent County, Virginia,
were not residentially segregated, 44 and the possibility of desegregation
through conventional neighborhood school assignment underscored the
perversity of allowing black children to attend neighbhorhood schools only
if their parents exercised choice. Yet the existence of rural school districts
with substantial residential integration, though once common throughout
the South, does not characterize the urban centers where many low-income
and minority children live today in concentrated poverty and racial
isolation. Meaningful choice for these children often means the ability to
choose a school other than a neighborhood public school.
For low-income and minority parents who want such choice, there are
four possibilities: (1) another public school in the same school district; (2)
a charter school; (3) another public school outside of the district; or (4) a
private school. 45 We examine each in turn and then offer two ideas for
increasing the desegregative impact of school choice.
The first option, intradistrict public school choice, is the most widely
available, 46 but, in many inner cities, the least educationally consequential.
To be sure, there are selective public schools in urban districts, such as
Boston Latin School, Stuyvesant and Bronx Science in New York, and
Lowell High School in San Francisco, as well as magnet schools that offer
superb educational alternatives. And in a few districts, such as Berkeley,
California, and Cambridge, Massachusetts, controlled choice plans help to
ensure racial and socioeconomic integration within each school.4 7 The
reality, however, is that many city schools with predominantly minority and
low-income students are located in city school districts with predominantly
43. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
44. See id. at 432 ("There is no residential segregation in the county; persons of both
races reside throughout.").
45. Homeschooling is a fifth possibility, but not one that provides meaningful choice for
most low-income families. See Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Trends in
the Use of School Choice, 1993 to 1999, at 21 (2003), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/200303l.pdf.
46. See Jeffrey R. Henig & Stephen D. Sugarman, The Nature and Extent of School
Choice, in School Choice and Social Controversy 13, 17 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Frank R.
Kemerer eds., 1999).
47. See Charles V. Willie & Michael J. Alves, Controlled Choice: A New Approach to
Desegregated Education and School Improvement (1996).
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minority and low-income students.48 The educational challenges faced by a
low-performing urban school often pervade many if not most schools
within the district. Accordingly, there are few meaningful options for
public school choice within district boundaries in inner-city school systems.
In recent years, charter schools have provided additional choices for
disadvantaged schoolchildren. But the available evidence suggests that
charter schools, as implemented, do not help much in reducing racial and
socioeonomic isolation because "[m]ost charter schools are located in urban
school districts" and "almost all charter schools enroll students from their
home districts. '49 On the whole, charter schools enroll a larger percentage
of black students than non-charter public schools (33% to 17% in 2000-
2001), a smaller percentage of whites (43% to 59%), and comparable levels
of Latinos and Asians. 50 Aggregate data, however, mask troubling school-
and district-level trends: 89% of black charter school students attend
schools with more than 50% minority enrollment, and 70% attend charter
schools with 90% to 100% minority enrollment. 51 Charter schools are
typically less racially integrated than their surrounding districts and often
less integrated than neighboring public schools. 52 Carol Ascher's study of
552 charter schools in 317 school districts in twenty-six states found that
27% of charter schools, compared to only 10% of their surrounding school
districts, enrolled more than 80% minority students. 53 Similarly, "charter
schools are more likely to be found on one end of the poverty continuum or
the other." 54  Ascher's study found that only 35% of charter schools,
compared to 72% of their home school districts, had socioeconomically
diverse enrollments (i.e., enrollments in which 20% to 80% of students
48. For example, in the 2001-2002 school year, 93% of students in Atlanta were
nonwhite and 80% were low income (i.e., eligible for free or reduced-price lunch); 90% in
Baltimore were nonwhite and 67% were low income; 85% in Boston were nonwhite and
71% were low income; 90% in Chicago were nonwhite and 78% were low income; 81% in
Cleveland were nonwhite and 77% were low income; 72% in Dayton were nonwhite and
74% were low income; 91% in Houston were nonwhite and 73% were low income; 90% in
Los Angeles were nonwhite and 73% were low income; 85% in New York were nonwhite
and 73% were low income; 91% in Newark were nonwhite and 81% were low income; 83%
in St. Louis were nonwhite and 77% were low income; and 96% in Washington, D.C., were
nonwhite and 61% were low income. See Council of the Great City Schs., City-by-City
Statistics 2001-2002, http://www.cgcs.org/pdfs/citybycity03.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
49. James E. Ryan & Michael Heise, The Political Economy of School Choice, 111 Yale
L.J. 2043, 2075, 2076 (2002); see Erika Frankenberg & Chungmei Lee, Charter Schools and
Race: A Lost Opportunity for Integrated Education 26-28 & tbl.7 (2003), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Charter-Schools03.pdf (last visited
Sept. 12, 2005).
50. See Frankenberg & Lee, supra note 49, at 22-23 & tbl.2; see also U.S. Dep't of
Educ., The State of Charter Schools 2000, at 30 (2001), available at
http://www.ed.gov/PDFDocs/4yrrpt.pdf.
51. See Frankenberg & Lee, supra note 49, at 23 & tbl.3.
52. See Wells et al., supra note 20, at 191-99.
53. See id. at 191 (citing Carol Ascher et al., Charter School Access: A Preliminary
Analysis of Charter School Legislation and Charter School Students (1999)).
54. Id. at 201.
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qualified for free or reduced-price lunch). 55 In other words, the percentage
of low-income children in nearly two-thirds of charter schools, but in less
than one-third of their local districts, was either less than 20% or more than
80%. Thus, "when you look at school- and district-level data, charter
schools are more extreme in terms of racial and social class isolation and
segregation than the districts in which they are located." 56 Although these
data do not definitively show that charter schools exacerbate segregation-
for such proof, we need school-level studies that examine whether students
attending segregated charter schools left less segregated non-charter
schools-the available evidence hardly suggests that charter schools are
powerful engines of desegregation.
Many factors likely account for the racial and socioeconomic segregation
in charter schools. First, few states have charter laws that require or
encourage racial or socioeconomic diversity in charter schools; indeed,
nineteen states say nothing about diversity at all. 57 And even in states that
require charter schools to achieve a level of diversity reflective of their
surrounding school districts, there is little evidence of monitoring,
enforcement, or compliance, 58 and the racial balance provision in at least
one state's charter law has been declared unconstitutional. 59 Second, many
charter laws require or encourage charter schools to locate in urban areas
and to prioritize or admit only students from the local district.60 Third,
many charter schools have admissions policies with academic or other
criteria that tend to produce homogeneity among the students enrolled. 61
Some charter schools are designed to serve primarily at-risk students, who
55. See id. at 200-01 (citing Ascher et al., supra note 53, at 12).
56. Id. at 202; see also Frankenberg & Lee, supra note 49, at 14 (collecting studies).
Emerging evidence shows a disparity between the educational opportunities available in
predominantly minority charter schools and those available in predominantly white charter
schools. For example, a 1999 study of twenty-two Phoenix-area charter schools showed that
twelve schools had a "college prep" curriculum while ten offered a vocational education
program. Of the 1865 students attending the former schools, 86% were white; of the 1635
students attending the latter, less than 40% were white. See Casey D. Cobb & Gene V. Glass,
Ethnic Segregation in Arizona Charter Schools, 7 Educ. Policy Analysis Archives 1, para.
87 (1999), available at http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v7nl/.
57. See Wells et al., supra note 20, at 215.
58. See id. (citing two studies of California charter schools).
59. Until 2002, a provision of South Carolina's charter law provided that "under no
circumstances may a charter school enrollment differ from the racial composition of the
school district by more than ten percent." S.C. Code Ann. § 59-40-50(B)(6) (2001). In May
2000, a state circuit court declared the provision unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds. See Darcia Harris Bowman, Judge Overturns South Carolina's Charter School
Law, Educ. Wk., May 24, 2000, at 25. In July 2002, the provision was amended to exempt
charter schools from racial balance requirements upon a finding by the local school district
that the charter school "is not operating in a racially discriminatory manner." S.C. Code Ann.
§ 59-40-70(D) (2003); see Beaufort County Bd. of Educ. v. Lighthouse Charter Sch. Comm.,
576 S.E.2d 180 (S.C. 2003) (upholding the amended charter law).
60. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 49, at 2075-77.
61. See Wells et al., supra note 20, at 204-07, 211-13.
[Vol. 74
SCHOOL CHOICE
are disproportionately urban, poor, and minority.62 Indeed, Texas and
Connecticut have charter laws providing favorable treatment to schools
serving 75% or more at-risk or minority students. 63 Finally, targeted and
word-of-mouth recruitment "circumscribed by race, social class, and
language" may contribute to segregation in charter schools. 64
In expressing wariness toward intradistrict choice and charter schools, we
do not mean to disparage the efforts of innovative educators working in
predominantly poor and minority communities, some of whom are
succeeding against the odds.65 Nor do we mean to suggest that inner-city
parents are wasting their time if they transfer their children from a low-
performing neighborhood school to another public school in the same
district. Our point is simply that choice within urban district boundaries
does not alter the basic geography of educational inequality. That
inequality, which limits the odds of finding high-quality educational
opportunities through intradistrict choice, is due in substantial part to the
failure of equal protection law to require the elimination of interdistrict
disparities in school resources, 66 and to the failure of desegregation law to
require suburban jurisdictions, whose local autonomy exists by grace of the
state, to help remedy historic state-sponsored racial discrimination in urban
school districts. 67 As a result, inner-city schoolchildren have been left to
choose among high-poverty, racially isolated schools, while suburbanites
have exercised "local control" to insulate their neighborhood schools
racially and socioeconomically. 68
62. In Washington, D.C., for example, the Maya Angelou Public Charter School serves
students, often referred by judges, who are involved in the criminal justice system.
63. See Wells et al., supra note 20, at 213-14.
64. Id. at 204. The educational efficacy of charter schools has been a subject of recent
controversy. Compare F. Howard Nelson et al., Am. Fed'n of Teachers, Charter School
Achievement on the 2003 National Assessment of Educational Progress (2004) (finding few
differences of student achievement between charter schools and regular public schools),
with Caroline M. Hoxby, A Straightforward Comparison of Charter Schools and Regular
Public Schools in the United States (2004), available at
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/hoxby/papers/hoxbyallcharters.pdf (finding that
students at charter schools perform better in math and reading than students at neighboring
traditional public schools). As one commentator has observed, it is too early to draw firm
conclusions about charter school performance because the results of existing studies are
limited by difficulties in defining proper comparison groups, the diversity of charter schools
and their local environments, and the narrow range of outcome measures available. See Paul
T. Hill, Assessing Student Performance in Charter Schools: Why Studies Often Clash and
Answers Remain Elusive, Educ. Wk., Jan. 12, 2005, at 33.
65. For some examples, see Charles A. Dana Ctr., Univ. of Tex. at Austin, Hope for
Urban Education: A Study of Nine High-Performing, High-Poverty, Urban Elementary
Schools (1999), available at http://www.ed.gov/PDFDocs/urbaned.pdf.
66. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55-56 (1973).
67. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974).
68. As Justice Byron White made clear in Milliken, the notion of "local control" in
constitutional law effectively means suburban local control. After all,
presently constituted school district lines do not delimit fixed and unchangeable
areas of a local educational community. If restructuring is required to meet
constitutional requirements, local authority may simply be redefined in terms of
whatever configuration is adopted, with the parents of the children attending
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For poor and minority students in urban areas, the principal means of
obtaining a desegregated public education is to cross an urban district
boundary into a suburban school. This is easier said than done. But where
it has been done, the results have been encouraging. In St. Louis, Boston,
Indianapolis, Wilmington, and Hartford, for example, interdistrict choice
and transfer policies have facilitated desegregation and improved
opportunties for urban schoolchildren while garnering public support.69
Yet despite these initiatives, "the number of students participating in
interdistrict choice is minuscule," comprising less than 1% of public school
students.70
The paucity of opportunities for interdistrict choice is not surprising
given the historic reluctance of predominantly white and middle-class
suburban communities to welcome poor and minority children from inner
cities into their schools. Although some of the reluctance reflects prejudice
and intolerance, a further explanation is that suburban taxpayers are wary of
spending their local tax dollars on the education of nonresidents.
Regrettably, federal and state school choice policies have made little effort
to bridge the urban-suburban divide. For example, as mentioned earlier, the
NCLB requires school districts receiving Title I funds to provide students in
schools identified for improvement with an option to transfer to another
public school in the same district, including a charter school, that has not
been identified for improvement. 71 But the law makes only perfunctory
mention of interdistrict choice. It requires that school districts unable to
provide transfer options "must, to the extent practicable, establish a
cooperative agreement with other [school districts] in the area for a
transfer."'72  Inner-city students seeking transfers to suburban schools
should hardly hold their breath for "practicable" cooperative agreements to
materialize, for the statute does not provide any tangible encouragement for
schools in the newly demarcated district or attendance zone continuing their
participation in the policy management of the schools with which they are
concerned most directly.
Id. at 778 (White, J., dissenting).
69. See Susan E. Eaton, The Other Boston Busing Story: What's Won and Lost Across
the Boundary Line (2001); Gary Orfield, City-Suburban Desegregation: Parent and Student
Perspectives in Metropolitan Boston (1997), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/metro/CitySuburbanDeseg.pdf; Wells &
Crain, supra note 28; William H. Freivogel, St. Louis: Desegregation and School Choice in
the Land of Dred Scott, in The Report of the Century Foundation Task Force on the
Common School, Divided We Fail: Coming Together Through Public School Choice 209
(2002); Tom Stites, Busing Quietly Making a Difference, Chi. Trib., Oct. 13, 1985, § 2 at 17;
Study Finds Desegregation Is an Effective Social Tool, N.Y. Times, Sept. 17, 1985, at Cl.
See generally Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan
Society, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 825 (1996); Mahard & Crain, supra note 27, at 117-19.
70. Ryan & Heise, supra note 49, at 2066.
71. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i) (West 2005). The statute directs school districts
to "give priority to the lowest achieving children from low-income families." Id.
§ 6316(b)(1)(E)(ii).
72. Id. § 6316(b)(1 1); see 34 C.F.R. § 200.44(h)(1) (2002).
[Vol. 74
SCHOOL CHOICE
neighboring districts to accept transfer students from urban schools. 73
Similarly, at the state level, the vast majority of open-enrollment laws,
though ostensibly affording students a choice of any school within the state,
do not require school districts to accept nonresident students. 74 As a result,
many districts simply decline to participate in open-enrollment plans due to
lack of capacity or lack of interest, or both.75
Finally, do private schools present opportunities for urban schoolchildren
to obtain a desegregated education? The answer, we think, depends on how
access to private schools is provided. A universal voucher program with no
eligibility requirements based on socioeconomic or educational
disadvantage (i.e., a program that is available to poor and middle-class
parents on the same terms) would likely increase segregation in both public
and private schools. Forty years after white parents in the South fled to
private schools to avoid desegregation, "the strongest predictor of white
private school enrollment rates ... [remains] the percentage of students
living in the district who are black.'' 76 A voucher program with no
eligibility restrictions would enable a portion of the white families
remaining in urban school districts to choose private schools, thereby
deepening public school segregation and, at the same time, crowding out
minority students seeking access to majority-white private schools.
On the other hand, a targeted voucher program adopted with the explicit
objective of fostering socioeconomic diversity with restrictions based on
income or other indicators of disadvantage would, in theory, enable poor
and minority children to attend private schools alongside white peers whose
families are able to afford tuition. There is evidence to support this.
Relative to their proportions in public schools, white students are
overrepresented and black and Latino students are underrepresented in
73. During the rulemaking for Title I of NCLB, one commenter recommended that the
Department of Education regulate the state role in encouraging interdistrict transfer
agreements. The Secretary of Education declined, explaining that "it would be inappropriate
to regulate in this area of State authority," 67 Fed. Reg. 71,710, 71,755 (Dec. 2, 2002)-
hardly a persuasive answer in the context of a statute and accompanying regulations that
leave virtually no aspect of state authority over education policy immune from federal
regulation.
74. See Ryan & Heise, supra note 49, at 2066-67.
75. See id. at 2067.
76. Sean F. Reardon & John T. Yun, Private School Enrollment and Racial Segregation
43 (2002), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/Private_
Schools.pdf (reporting that "the percent black in the district alone explained 49 percent of
the variance in white private school enrollment rates"). Controlling for a school district's
poverty rate does not significantly attenuate the positive relationship between percentage of
black students and white private school enrollment. See id.; see also Brian P. Gill et al.,
RAND, Rhetoric Versus Reality: What We Know and What We Need to Know About
Vouchers and Charter Schools 173 (2001) (discussing studies suggesting that "a voucher
program widely available to white families will lead to increased stratification" by race and
socioeconomic class); Reardon & Yun, supra, at 42 (collecting studies finding that white
private school enrollment is higher in districts with higher percentages of blacks and that
"racial differences in private school enrollment rates cannot be explained by racial
differences in income alone").
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private schools. 77  Nationally, white students experience more racial
isolation in private schools than in public schools, Latino students
experience less, and black students experience similar levels. 78  For
purposes of evaluating a voucher program targeted to inner-city students,
however, these national data are not as informative as data from large
metropolitan areas where there are high concentrations of poor and minority
schoolchildren. In the nation's twenty largest metropolitan areas, white
students remain overrepresented and more racially isolated in private
schools as a whole relative to public schools. 79 However, in each one of
these large metropolitan areas, the average black student and the average
Latino student go to school with a higher percentage of white students in
private schools than in public schools. 80 In Minneapolis-St. Paul, the
average black student has 60.6% white peers in private school versus 43.4%
in public school; in Dallas, 42.4% white peers in private school versus
27.7% white peers in public school; in Cleveland, 30.9% versus 22.1%; in
Oakland, 28.8% versus 19.2%.81 Similarly, the average Latino student in
Houston has 46.6% white peers in private school versus 23.3% in public
school; in Chicago, 40.1% versus 27.2%; in New York, 23.4% versus
11.5%; in Los Angeles, 23.6% versus 11.3%.82 To be sure, the percentages
indicate that most private schools attended by minority students are still
predominantly minority. But the public-versus-private comparison shows
that minority students in large metropolitan areas are more likely to find
less severe racial isolation in private schools than in public schools.83
Other data suggest that targeted voucher programs may have
desegregative effects. In Cleveland, for example, nearly 70% of students in
the city's public schools, compared to less than 38% of voucher students,
77. See Reardon & Yun, supra note 76, at 17 tbl.3.
78. Whereas the average public school attended by a white student was 80.9% white in
1997-1998, the average private school attended by a white student was 88.4% white, and
whereas 46.9% of white public school students attended a school that was 90% to 100%
white, 63.6% of white private school students attended such racially segregated schools. See
id at 52 tbls.C1 & C2. The average public school attended by a black student was 32.6%
white, while the average private school attended by a black student was 34.3% white. See id.
Nevertheless, whereas 34.4% of black public school students attended a school that was 90%
to 100% nonwhite, 43.7% of black private school students attended such heavily minority
schools. See id. The average public school attended by a Latino student was 29.7% white,
while the average private school attended by a Latino student was 41.1% white. See id. And
whereas 35.7% of Latino public school students attended a school that was 90% to 100%
nonwhite, only 27.1% of Latino private school students attended such heavily minority
schools. See id.
79. Seeid. at 39 tbl.16.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See Jay P. Greene, Civic Values in Public and Private Schools, in Learning from
School Choice 83, 97-98 & tbl.4-2 (Paul E. Peterson & Bryan C. Hassel eds., 1998)
(showing that in the Northeast, Midwest, West, and South, the percentage of minority
students in urban private schools is closer to the national average than the percentage of
minority students in urban public schools).
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attend a school with 70% or greater minority enrollment. 84 In addition,
19% of voucher students, compared to 10% of city public school students,
attend a school that is within 10% of the average racial composition of the
Cleveland metropolitan area. 85  In Milwaukee, the percentage of
schoolchildren in 2001-2002 attending 90% minority or 90% white schools
was 54.4% among public school students, 49.8% among voucher students
overall, and 41.8% among voucher students attending religious schools. 86
Finally, in privately funded voucher programs in New York, Dayton, and
Washington, D.C., voucher parents were ten percentage points more likely
than parents denied a voucher by lottery to report that their children
attended a class where a majority of his or her peers were white. 87
Targeted voucher programs thus appear to help inner-city minority
children to find educational settings that are less racially isolated than their
local public schools. Nevertheless, the desegregative effects are modest.
This may be attributable in part to the modest voucher payments offered by
the programs (currently $1400 to $3000 in the private voucher programs, up
84. See Jay P. Greene, The Racial, Economic, and Religious Context of Parental Choice
in Cleveland 14 tbl. 1 (1999), available at http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org/data/research/
Clevint.pdf.
85. See id at 8. Although Greene concludes from these data that "school choice in
Cleveland contributes to racial integration," id. at 2, his study and the Milwaukee data below
are only suggestive of desegregative effects. More probative evidence would be a
comparison of the racial composition of schools attended by voucher students with the racial
composition of the particular schools each voucher student would have attended had he or
she not used a voucher. Only through such a comparison can we be certain whether each
voucher had a segregative or desegregative effect.
86. See Howard L. Fuller & Deborah Greiveldinger, The Impact of School Choice on
Racial Integration in Milwaukee Private Schools 5 tbl.1, 6 tbl.2 (2002), available at
http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org/data/research/integ0802.pdf. Similarly, in 1999-2000, the
percentage of Milwaukee schoolchildren attending such segregated schools was 50.3%
among public school students, 42.9% among voucher students, and 30.1% among voucher
students in religious schools. See Howard L. Fuller & George A. Mitchell, The Impact of
School Choice on Integration in Milwaukee Private Schools 8 tbl.8 (2000), available at
http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org/data/research/integ600.pdf. Milwaukee voucher students
attending nonreligious schools experience higher levels of racial isolation; 75.5% of such
students attended 90% white or 90% minority schools in 2001-2002. See Fuller &
Greiveldinger, supra, at 4, 6 tbl.2. This is because many of those nonreligious private
schools were started long before 1990 (when the voucher program began) as alternatives for
black or Latino children whose parents were concerned about the quality of Milwaukee
public schools. See John F. Witte, The Market Approach to Education: An Analysis of
America's First Voucher Program 84-87 (2000). The Milwaukee pattern, in which secular
private schools are more segregated than religious private schools, is an anomaly in the
national context. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text.
87. See William G. Howell & Paul E. Peterson, The Education Gap: Vouchers and
Urban Schools 128 (2002). Voucher parents in the national Children's Scholarship Fund
program were twenty-one percentage points more likely than parents denied a voucher by
lottery to report that their children attended majority-white classrooms. See id. These
findings should not be surprising, as private schools are, unlike public schools, not
constrained by local control and are generally free, if they choose, to accept applicants
throughout a metropolitan area. See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text. Nevertheless,
these data should be viewed cautiously because the study does not appear to independently
confirm the accuracy of the perceptions reported by the parents surveyed.
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to $2250 in Cleveland, and up to $5943 in Milwaukee), which leave many
nonsectarian schools out of reach. Secular private schools are substantially
less racially segregated than either public schools or religious private
schools. 88  They typically draw from a wider geographic area, thus
mitigating the effects of residential segregation, and they often seek racial
diversity more aggressively than religious schools. 89 But they are also
substantially more expensive. In 1999-2000, the average elementary school
tuition was $2451 at Catholic schools, $3503 at other religiously affiliated
schools, and $7884 at nonsectarian private schools. 90 Higher voucher
amounts would enable more inner-city children to attend less segregated,
more costly private schools.
III. NEW CHOICE INITIATIVES
Given these options for school choice and their shortcomings, what can
be done to increase their desegregative potential? We propose two ideas,
one addressing segregation in charter schools and the other addressing
limitations on interdistrict and private school choice.
First, we recommend a funding set-aside in federal and state charter
school programs to create and reward charter schools that reflect the racial
and socioeconomic diversity of the metropolitan area-not the local school
district-where they are located. Charter schools subject to racial balance
provisions that use local district demographics as a benchmark have little
desegregative impact in racially segregated, high-poverty school districts.
But because they typically have control over admissions policies and are
not required to serve exclusively students in the home district, charter
schools are uniquely positioned to draw students from many districts, both
urban and suburban, in a single metropolitan area. For this reason, set-aside
programs should use the racial composition of the broader metropolitan
area as the reference point for measuring and rewarding diversity. In
addition, because diverse charter schools, like racially integrated
nonsectarian private schools, will likely draw students from a wide
geographic area, some portion of incentive funds should be allocated for
88. See Reardon & Yun, supra note 76, at 30-31 & tbl.13, 38, 52 tbl.C-2, 53 tbls.C-3 &
C-4, 54 tbl.C-5. In 1997-1998, the percentage of white peers encountered by an average
black student was 32.6% in public schools, 31.2% in Catholic schools, and 34.6% in other
religious schools, but 40.6% in secular private schools. See id. at 52 tbl.C-2, 53 tbls.C-3 &
C-4, 54 tbl.C-5. In addition, the percentage of black students attending 90% minority
schools was significantly smaller among blacks attending secular private schools (32.0%)
than among blacks attending Catholic schools (48.4%). See id. at 53 tbl.C-3, 54 tbl.C-5.
Similarly, the percentage of white peers encountered by an average Latino student was
35.7% in public schools and 33.2% in Catholic schools, but 51.3% in other religious schools
and 50.4% in secular private schools. See id. at 52 tbl.C-2, 53 tbls.C-3 & C-4, 54 tbl.C-5.
Both secular and non-Catholic religious schools appear to be strong desegregative
alternatives for Latino students.
89. See id. at 38.
90. See Nat'l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Educ., Digest of Education Statistics
2002, at 73 tbl.61 (2003) [hereinafter Digest of Education Statistics].
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transportation and for recruitment of students through systematic outreach
to parents of different racial and socioeconomic backgrounds in a language
they can understand. In essence, we would like to see some charter schools
resemble desegregated magnet schools.
To implement incentives, federal and state governments could offer
grants or rewards for charter schools whose enrollment reflects the diversity
of the metropolitan area within, say, 10% of the proportion of students
within each major racial group and the proportion eligible for free or
reduced-price lunches. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Grutter v.
Bollinger91 helps to remove constitutional doubts that might arise from such
a race-conscious incentive program. And as a policy matter, state education
systems committed to achieving racial diversity on college campuses should
not hesitate to embrace the same goal for charter schools. Over the past
decade, charter schools have become a well-recognized fixture of school
choice. But because "choice" tends to imply that individual preferences,
not collective ideals, should guide educational consumption and supply, it is
vital that charter laws affirm the "common school" ideal92 and nurture and
reward innovations that best approximate it.
Second, we recommend increasing the desegregative potential of school
vouchers targeted to disadvantaged children by making vouchers
redeemable at both private and public schools, and by raising the voucher
amount so that it pays up to (a) the median tuition among nonsectarian
private schools in the local area or (b) the full portion of per-pupil
expenditure in a chosen public school attributable to local income or
property taxes.93 Until now, the most desegregative choices for inner-city
students-suburban public schools and nonsectarian private schools-have
largely been out of reach. But if the rhetoric of equal opportunity animating
current discussions of school vouchers is to have real bite, then voucher
programs should give poor and minority schoolchildren real choices-
indeed, the same choices presently available to suburban, middle-class
students by dint of greater wealth. This means a choice both among private
schools and among public schools, where exercise of the choice will have
desegregative impact.
The fact that the voucher debate has largely focused on private schools
reflects, in our view, an unspoken assumption that suburban public schools
are off-limits to inner-city children. The Milwaukee, Washington, D.C.,
and Florida voucher programs provide no assistance for students interested
91. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
92. Gill et al., supra note 76, at 19 (describing "common school" as a school that
"provides access to high-quality education for all children in the community-poor as well
as rich, African-American as well as white, and students with disabilities as well as those
with unusual talents," that "involves a healthy social mixing of children from all races and
classes," and that "educates children in the virtues of democratic citizenship").
93. Our assumption is that receiving schools will be allocated the state per-pupil share
for each transferring child, so we peg the voucher amount to the local share. See, e.g., infra
note 94 and accompanying text.
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in choosing an out-of-district public school. The Cleveland program, at
issue in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, allows vouchers to be used in adjacent
school districts, guaranteeing suburban schools the maximum voucher
amount on top of the per-pupil state allotment for each inner-city student
enrolled. 94 But not a single suburban district in Cleveland has elected to
participate. As the dissent in Zelman observed, the voucher amount
($2250) is not nearly enough to cover local contributions to per-pupil
expenditures in any but one suburban district (itself an "academic
emergency" district) and thus offers suburban districts no incentive to
accept voucher students. 95 By contrast, interdistrict choice has worked in
St. Louis in part because suburban jurisdictions enrolling city students
receive an incentive payment that covers the per-pupil amount raised
through local income or property taxes. 96
A more robust voucher program targeted to disadvantaged children-one
that neither restricts vouchers to private schools nor prices voucher
recipients out of nonsectarian private schools or suburban public schools-
would sensibly bridge the political divide between private and public school
choice. Grants for voluntary public school choice under NCLB could be
used to build interdistrict choice into voucher initiatives currently limited to
private schools. 97 The public-private divide has figured prominently in how
best to educate poor and minority urban schoolchildren largely because
"while there is often polite mention of the benefits of diversity, the
interdistrict efforts that would actually create that diversity are rarely
explored. s98 If we are willing to facilitate choice between public and
private schools for the sake of equal opportunity, then there is no reason we
should not facilitate choice between urban and suburban public schools at
the same time for the same reason.
Ideally, an inner-city student's desire to attend a suburban public school
should not be subject to a veto by suburban school districts in the name of
94. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 645 & n.1 (2002) (citing Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. §§ 3313.976(C), 3317.03(I)(1) (West 2000)). There is no reason why privately
sponsored voucher programs could not also allow vouchers to be used for interdistrict public
school choice. Indeed, the voucher program sponsored by the Children's Educational
Opportunity Foundation in San Antonio's Edgewood School District allows low-income
students to attend not only private schools but also public schools outside of the Edgewood
district. See Howell & Peterson, supra note 87, at 38.
95. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 707 & n.17 (Souter, J., dissenting).
96. See Wells & Crain, supra note 28, at 102.
97. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 7225 (2004) (authorizing competitive grants to establish or
expand voluntary public school choice). Indeed, the statute assigns priority to programs that,
among other things, "seek to implement an interdistrict approach" to public school choice.
Id. § 7225c(3). Although the statute authorizes up to $100 million for voluntary public
school choice initiatives, see id. § 7225g, Congress appropriated less than $27 million in
2004, see FY 2005 Congressional Action, Department of Education Budget Tables,
http://www.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/tables.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2005), and few
of the awarded grants appear to emphasize interdistrict choice. See Voluntary Public School
Choice Awards 2002-2003, http://www.ed.gov/programs/choice/awards.html (last visited
Sept. 12, 2005).
98. Eaton, supra note 69, at 251.
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local control, as is the case now, for example, under the choice provisions
of NCLB. If the political will is lacking in Congress and the states to
remove school district vetoes, then at a minimum vouchers should be
redeemable at individual public schools that value diversity. Even in
resistant districts, there may be school communities that understand and
seek the educational benefits of a diverse student body. In St. Louis, for
example, a great deal of support among suburban white parents and
students has developed for the interdistrict program. 99  All suburban
districts in the program except Ladue have continued participation well past
the time when under a 1999 agreement they could have given notice of an
intention to withdraw. 100
There are, of course, many important matters to be worked out in the
operation of a desegregative choice program. To begin with, schools
eligible to participate in a voucher program must meet basic standards of
safety, health, and fiscal reliability. Moreover, accountability is a crucial
concern. Public schools participating in a choice program will be subject to
state accountability systems mandated by the NCLB. The duties of private
schools will vary with state laws, but in many jurisdictions, the obligations
are minimal. We do not share the belief of many choice advocates that the
operation of the private market, by itself, will protect parents. Information
is vital to the effective functioning of markets, and many poor or non-
English-speaking parents have limited access to information. We thus
believe that private schools accepting public funds to educate children must
accept the obligation to be held accountable for each child's academic
progress and to publicly communicate information on such progress to the
communities they serve.101
On all of these issues, the key to success will be effective
implementation. Regulation need not be cumbersome. But if children are
to benefit from subsidized choice, government must ensure that the schools
ultimately receiving funds are appropriate educators and sound guardians of
each child's best interests.
IV. OVERCOMING OBJECTIONS
In this part, we address three concerns implicated by our proposals. The
first is that a voucher program, even one that is targeted to disadvantaged
99. See Wells & Crain, supra note 28, at 326.
100. See, e.g., Carolyn Bower, Students Stand Up for Diversity, St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
May 23, 2004, at B1 (reporting broad and vocal support among students at Clayton and
Mehlville High Schools for continuing the voluntary interdistrict transfer program with St.
Louis).
101. Moreover, we emphasize that private schools, though not constrained by the Equal
Protection Clause, are nevertheless subject to the nondiscrimination requirements of 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (2000). See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 172 (1976). In addition,
to the extent that private schools accept vouchers supported by federal funds, they are also
subject to the nondiscrimination requirements of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d.
2005]
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
children, will evolve into a broader, untargeted program that worsens
segregation and inequality. The second is that school choice primarily
benefits children of parents with the most motivation and resources, while
leaving the vast majority of children in failing schools behind. The third is
that by sanctioning new arrangements, "the common school" ideal of public
education and the role of public schools as the "balance wheel" for society
will be weakened.
A. Vouchers and Free-Market Ideology
The intellectual origins of school vouchers suggest that the ultimate aim
of voucher proponents is to replace the current system of public education
with a virtually unregulated, market-driven alternative. 10 2  Milton
Friedman's voucher proposal over forty years ago imagined a government
role in education "limited to assuring that the schools met certain minimum
standards such as the inclusion of a minimum common content in their
programs, much as it now inspects restaurants to assure that they maintain
minimum sanitary standards."' 1 3  Though aware of the resemblance
between his proposal and "freedom of choice" plans in the South, Friedman
rejected any requirement that schools make efforts to achieve racial
integration as a criterion for participating in a voucher system. 10 4 As
mentioned earlier, we oppose universal voucher programs of the sort
Friedman envisions. Just as "freedom of choice" during the 1960s
predictably replicated the background of racial inequality that had been
nurtured and protected under legal mandate, so too an unconstrained
voucher program would replicate or exacerbate in schools the racial and
socioeconomic inequality that exists in society.
Yet laissez-faire ideology, though prominent in the choice debate, has
had less influence on the current design of policy than the highly regulated
and redistributive models of choice advocated by War on Poverty-era
liberals. Not long after Friedman introduced his voucher proposal,
progressive reformers such as Theodore Sizer, Christopher Jencks, and John
Coons and Stephen Sugarman introduced voucher plans designed to benefit
the most disadvantaged children. 10 5  These advocates recognized the
102. See John E. Chubb & Terry M. Moe, Politics, Markets and America's Schools 217
(1990) ("[R]eformers would do well to entertain the notion that choice is a panacea.");
Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 85 (1962); Milton Friedman, The Role of
Government in Education, in Economics and the Public Interest 123 (Robert A. Solo ed.,
1955) [hereinafter Friedman, The Role of Government].
103. Friedman, The Role of Government, supra note 102, at 127.
104. See id. at 131 n.2.
105. See John E. Coons & Stephen D. Sugarman, Education by Choice: The Case for
Family Control (1978); John E. Coons & Stephen D. Sugarman, Family Choice in
Education: A Model State System for Vouchers (1971); Christopher Jencks, Ctr. for the
Study of Pub. Policy, Education Vouchers: A Report on Financing Education by Payments
to Parents (1970); Christopher Jencks, Giving Parents Money to Pay for Schooling:
Education Vouchers, New Republic, July 4, 1970, at 19; Theodore Sizer, The Case for a
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potential of school choice to subvert existing patterns of educational
inequality, and their ideas appear to occupy the political center of today's
voucher debate. Indeed, every public voucher program currently in
existence adopts a targeted approach, conditioning eligibility on the basis of
income, prior attendance at a low-performing school, or some other
measure of educational disadvantage. 106
For now, voucher policies seem to reflect less a free marketplace of
educational suppliers and consumers than a targeted social intervention to
aid the most disadvantaged. The question, however, is whether current
policies will undergo "an incremental shift from targeted programs intended
to provide increased educational opportunity for poor families to one
subsidizing all private schools-most of which are not attended by poor
students."' 0 7  Indeed, many voucher opponents see today's targeted
programs "as a conservative ploy, a way of using the poor to achieve the
traditionalists' long-run goals of free markets and universalism."' 0 8 The
concern is not unfounded. 10 9 Friedman, who wrote a 1997 article on school
choice entitled "Programs for the Poor Are Poor Programs," 110 reacted to
the Court's decision in Zelman by calling for "a major expansion of
Free Market, Saturday Rev., Jan. 11, 1969, at 34; Theodore Sizer & Philip Whitten, A
Proposalfor a Poor Children's Bill of Rights, Psychol. Today, Aug. 1968, at 59.
106. The Milwaukee voucher program is limited to families that qualify for federal food
stamps. See Howell & Peterson, supra note 87, at 30. The Cleveland program assigns
priority to families with income below twice the federal poverty line. See Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. § 3313.978 (West 2005). Florida offers vouchers to students who attend schools
identified by the state accountability system as "failing" for any two years of a four-year
period. See Fla. Stat. § 1002.38(1) (2005); see also infra note 136 (describing a similar
eligibility limitation in a newly enacted Ohio voucher program). The Washington, D.C.,
voucher program recently approved by Congress gives priority to students in public schools
identified for improvement or corrective action under the NCLB. See DC School Choice
Incentive Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 306(1), 118 Stat. 3, 129 (2004). Even
privately funded voucher programs restrict eligibility based on need. The nationwide
Children's Scholarship Fund program, a New York City program sponsored by the School
Choice Scholarships Foundation, and a San Antonio program sponsored by the Children's
Educational Opportunity Foundation admit only children eligible for free or reduced-price
lunch. See Howell & Peterson, supra note 87, at 34, 37, 38. A Dayton, Ohio, voucher
program sponsored by Parents Advancing Choice in Education is limited to families whose
income is less than twice the federal poverty level, and a Washington, D.C., program
sponsored by the Washington Scholarship Fund is limited to families with income less than
2.7 times the poverty level. See id. at 35.
107. Witte, supra note 86, at 183.
108. Terry M. Moe, Schools, Vouchers, and the American Public 378 (2001). Moe
describes
suspicions.., within the voucher movement, among representatives of the urban
poor-who see vouchers as a way of empowering their own constituents, but do
not want to be used, and do not want programs for needy children to serve as a
springboard for broader free-market programs that might leave the needy behind
again.
Id.
109. See, e.g., Witte, supra note 86, at 184-87 (cataloging voucher supporters' strategy of
using modest, targeted experiments as springboards for universal programs).
110. Milton Friedman, Programs for the Poor Are Poor Programs, in A Choice for Our
Children 191 (Alan Bonsteel & Carlos A. Bonilla eds., 1997).
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parental school choice" that would "make [vouchers] available to all
students, not simply to students from low-income families."' 111
We have no doubt that many voucher enthusiasts regard existing
programs as a wedge into a broader agenda, and admittedly, our call for
targeted vouchers with higher dollar values may generate pressure to
expand eligibility. But the success of any drive to make vouchers universal
depends less on its proponents' intentions than on political dynamics on the
ground, and those dynamics do not bode well for universality. The voucher
movement has a constituency among some elements of the conservative
spectrum, notably Catholics and born-again Christians. 112 But there is little
evidence that the free-market ideology of political and academic elites is
widely shared by rank-and-file conservatives. Perhaps the best illustration
of this is that "[e]very proposal to provide vouchers on a large scale has
failed" both in state legislatures and, more visibly, at the ballot box." l3
"Between 1990 and 1993 alone, for example, fourteen state legislatures
considered and ultimately rejected voucher proposals.""14 In addition,
voters soundly rejected a 1990 Oregon tuition tax credit initiative by a two-
to-one margin; a 1992 Colorado voucher initiative by 67% to 33%; a 1993
California voucher initiative by 70% to 30%; a 1996 Washington state
voucher initiative by 66% to 34%; and a 1998 Colorado tuition tax credit
initiative by 59% to 41%.'15
Although these results are partly attributable to robust opposition from
teachers' unions and the peculiar dynamics of ballot initiatives,"16 large-
scale voucher programs have failed also "because suburbanites did not
support them." 1 7 School choice does not have an ardent following among
middle-class voters who, though politically conservative, are largely
satisfied with their public schools. 118 Explaining the defeat of Proposition
174, the 1993 California voucher initiative, The Manhattan Institute's
associate director John Miller observed the following:
Most suburbanites-the folks who make up the GOP's rank and file-are
happy with their kids' school systems. Their children already earn good
grades, score well on tests, and gain admission into reputable colleges and
universities. Moreover, suburban affluence grants a measure of freedom
in choosing where to live and thus provides at least some control over
111. See Milton Friedman, The Market Can Transform Our Schools, N.Y. Times, July 2,
2002, at A19.
112. See Moe, supra note 108, at 254, 255.
113. Ryan & Heise, supra note 49, at 2079-80.
114. Id. at 2079 (citing Amy Stuart Wells, Time to Choose: America at the Crossroads of
School Choice Policy 157-58 (1993)).
115. See Moe, supra note 108, at 359, 365.
116. See id. at 358-69.
117. Ryan & Heise, supra note 49, at 2080.
118. See Lowell C. Rose & Alec M. Gallup, The 36th Annual Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup
Poll of the Public's Attitudes Toward the Public Schools, Phi Delta Kappan, Sept. 2004, at
41, 42 (finding that "61% of parents give the schools in their community an A or a B" and
concluding that "[t]he trend line showing that the public in general gives reasonably high
marks to the public schools continues").
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school selection. It's not that suburbanites refuse to admit the country's
deep education crisis; they just don't believe the problem affects them
personally. 119
Suburbanites, "hav[ing] already paid a premium in purchasing their homes
in order to ensure that their children attend good public schools," do not
share the sense of frustration with public education that prompts many
inner-city parents to support vouchers. 120
The most recent statewide voucher proposals in California, Michigan,
and Colorado confirm where the political center lies on school vouchers. In
2000, the California ballot included an initiative proposing a $4000 voucher
for every child with almost no regulations to ensure accountability and
equity. Although proponents and opponents each spent $30 million on their
respective campaigns, the universal voucher initiative was defeated by 71%
to 29%, almost exactly the same margin by which Proposition 174, a
similar free-market proposal, was defeated in 1993.121 Also in 2000,
Michigan voters considered an initiative proposing a $3300 voucher for
every child living in a school district where one-third or more students fail
to graduate from high school within four years. Because the initiative was
smaller and more targeted than California's, the Michigan initiative more
easily attracted support from religious, business, and urban minority elites,
and proponents raised twice as much money as opponents ($13 million to
$6 million).' 22 But the scale of the proposal was still unprecedented. At
the time, 180,000 children in seven school districts, including Detroit Public
Schools, would have qualified for a voucher. 123 (For comparison, the
largest public voucher program in existence, Milwaukee's, had 13,978
participants during the 2004-2005 school year. 124) With the blessing of
Republican Governor John Engler, voucher opponents defeated the
initiative by 69% to 31%.125
In the wake of the Supreme Court's Zelman decision, Colorado in 2003
became the second state (after Florida in 1999126) to enact a statewide
119. John J. Miller, Why School Choice Lost, Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1993, at A14, quoted in
Ryan & Heise, supra note 49, at 2080-81.
120. Ryan & Heise, supra note 49, at 2081. Similarly, suburban residents, seeing little
need for educational alternatives, have been less interested in charter schools than urban
residents. See id. at 2077 (noting suburbanites' perception that existence of charter schools
signals the failure of public schools).
121. Moe, supra note 108, at 366.
122. See id. at 367-68; cf Felicia Wong, Vouchers that Win, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 2000,
at A35 (predicting wider support for Michigan's targeted voucher proposal than for
California's universal proposal).
123. See Jacques Steinberg, The 2000 Campaign: The Stars and School Education
Initiatives; Frustrated Parents Hope Their Votes Will Change Schools' Ways, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 10, 2000, at A23.
124. See Milwaukee Parental Choice Program, Facts and Figures for 2004-2005,
http://dpi.wi.gov/sms/doc/mpc04fnf.doc (last visited Sept. 12, 2005).
125. See Moe, supra note 108, at 367-68.
126. See Fla. Stat. § 1002.38 (2005). Florida's statewide Opportunity Scholarships
program, which offers $4355 vouchers to students in persistently failing schools, currently
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voucher program. Although the program has since been invalidated under
the state constitution, 127 its limitations as a matter of policy design are
instructive for our point here. The four-year pilot program applied only to
the eleven school districts that had eight or more schools rated low or
unsatisfactory by the state accountability system during the 2001-2002
school year. 128 Students were eligible only if they qualifed for free or
reduced-price lunch, enrolled in a public school the previous year, and
performed at an unsatisfactory level in at least one academic area on the
most recent statewide assessment. 129 In order to enroll voucher students,
nonpublic schools could not discriminate in admissions on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, or disability, 130 and they had to allow the
sending school district to administer statewide academic assessments to
voucher students,' 3 ' the results of which were to be reported publicly. 132
Moreover, the total number of voucher students was capped at 1% of each
sending district's enrollment in the first year of the program (2004-2005), at
2% in the next year, at 4% in the following year, and at 6% in the fourth
year of the pilot. 133 At its peak, the program was projected to provide
vouchers for 20,000 students. 134
Although Colorado's program, had it been implemented, would have
been almost twice the size of Milwaukee's, its magnitude is still a mere
fraction of the significantly broader ambitions decisively rejected in
California and Michigan. 135 And its regulatory features are a far cry from
the free-market libertarianism advocated by Friedman and others. Although
serves only 720 students. See Alan Richard, Court Showdown over Fla. Vouchers Nears,
Educ. Wk., May 25, 2005, at 1. Three lower courts have invalidated the program under the
state constitution, and the issue is now pending before the Florida Supreme Court. See id.
This spring, when Governor Jeb Bush proposed additional vouchers for 170,000 students
who have failed the state reading test three years in a row, the Republican-controlled
legislature quickly defeated the measure. See Joetta L. Sack, Gov. Bush's Voucher, Class-
Size Proposals Fail in 2005 Session, Educ. Wk., May 18, 2005, at 16.
127. See Owens v. Colo. Cong. of Parents, Teachers, & Students, 92 P.3d 933 (Colo.
2004) (invalidating the voucher program under the state constitutional provision
guaranteeing control over instruction to local school districts).
128. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-56-103(10)(a)(I) (2003).
129. See id. § 22-56-104(2)(a),(b).
130. See id. § 22-56-106(1)(b).
131. See id. § 22-56-106(1)(e).
132. See id. § 22-56-110(1).
133. See id. § 22-56-104(5)(a).
134. See Alan Richard, Gov. Owens Pledges to Sign Colorado Voucher Bill, Educ. Wk.,
Apr. 9, 2003, at 22.
135. This is true even when we account for the fact that Colorado's student population is
smaller than California's or Michigan's. The 180,000 students who would have been
eligible for a voucher under Michigan's 2000 initiative, see supra note 123 and
accompanying text, would have amounted to over 10% of the state's K-12 enrollment. See
Digest of Education Statistics, supra note 90, at 51 tbl.37 (providing estimated 2001 fall
enrollments). By contrast, the 20,000 voucher-eligible students contemplated under
Colorado's program would amount to only 2.7% of the state's K-12 enrollment. See id.
California's 2000 initiative would have provided vouchers to all students statewide. See
Moe, supra note 108, at 366.
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some advocates may eventually seek to transform the program into
something more universal and laissez-faire, the reality is that its modest
design, narrowly targeted and carefully regulated, is what accounts for its
political success. The Colorado program and others like it136 support the
view that if voucher proponents "move[] to the political center, opting for a
voucher system that [i]s small and low-risk, regulated to promote
accountability and equity, and targeted at children in need, they might...
attract[] far higher levels of public (and elite) support."'137
We believe that, for the foreseeable future, the political center will
continue to reflect the concerns of middle-class suburbanites who are
largely content with their neighborhood public schools. Though aware of-
and in some cases sympathetic to-the difficulties facing public schools in
inner cities, suburban voters are skeptical of proposals that might
dramatically alter the school attendance and finance policies responsible for
the racial and socioeconomic makeup of schools in their chosen
communities. As James E. Ryan and Michael Heise predicted before the
Supreme Court decided Zelman, political limitations on the scope and
contours of school choice are unlikely to change even with a strongly
worded opinion endorsing the use of vouchers at religious schools.
Contrary to Friedman's view that Zelman "clears the way for a major
expansion of parental school choice," 138 the decision actually "do[es] less
to remove the real constraints on voucher programs than it [does] to reveal
them."'139 Those constraints, we believe, will inhibit the expansion of
vouchers toward free-market universality.
B. "Skimming"
At the same time, however, the political constraints just discussed also
limit the extent to which school choice can reduce the racial and
socioeconomic isolation of disadvantaged children. Some middle-class
whites will be attracted to charter schools that are diverse by race and class.
And some inner-city minority students will have an opportunity to attend an
integrated private school or a suburban public school under a more robust
voucher program. But the reality is that the degree of integration
achievable in any local context is circumscribed by political considerations
having to do with racial or class perceptions. Even in St. Louis, the largest
interdistrict transfer program in the nation, suburban jurisdictions are
136. In July 2005, Ohio became the third state to pass statewide voucher legislation. Its
program also takes a targeted approach, providing "state-financed scholarships of up to
$5000 each for as many as 14,000 students who attend public schools that have been in
'academic emergency' for three consecutive years." Christina A. Samuels & Karla Scoon
Reid, Ohio OKs Vouchers for Pupils in Low-Rated Schools, Educ. Wk., July 13, 2005, at 23.
137. Moe, supra note 108, at 363.
138. Friedman, supra note 111.
139. Ryan & Heise, supra note 49, at 2050. Apart from Ohio's recent enactment of a
statewide voucher program, proposals for major expansion of private school choice have had
little success in state legislatures since Zelman. See Alan Richard, School Choice Loses
Legislative Momentum, Educ. Wk., June 8, 2005, at 20.
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required to enroll only 25% black students, and fewer than one-third of
black inner-city students participated in the program at its peak. 140 Clearly,
school choice is not a complete solution to the challenge of educating inner-
city schoolchildren, and a key concern is whether it helps more than it hurts.
One dimension of this concern is whether choice has a "skimming"
effect, benefiting more advantaged students while leaving less advantaged
students behind. A Citizens' Commission on Civil Rights study of magnet
schools in three communities showed that despite racial desegregation, low-
income families were less likely to participate in magnets than in regular
schools, a condition the Commission found could be ameliorated by a
variety of initiatives. 141 As for charter schools, the answer varies to a
significant extent according to the purposes of specific schools. Although
skimming likely occurs in charter schools designed to attract students who
meet certain academic criteria, selection in favor of educational
disadvantage may occur in charter schools focused on at-risk students. 142
As for vouchers, there is some data bearing on the question of skimming.
Two recent surveys of existing research agree that vouchers, as currently
implemented, have only modest skimming effects based on prior academic
achievement or socioeconomic criteria. 143  Voucher programs "serve
relatively low-achieving students; there is no evidence that voucher schools
are 'creaming' high-achieving students from the public schools."' 144 In
privately funded voucher programs, there appear to be few differences in
student and family characteristics between voucher users and the eligible
population. For example, in the nationwide program sponsored by the
Children's Scholarship Foundation, voucher users were slightly more likely
to live with both parents and to have lived in the same residence for two
years. 145  In the San Antonio program sponsored by the Children's
Educational Opportunity Foundation, voucher users were slightly less likely
to have limited English proficiency, to have parents receiving government
assistance, and to be economically disadvantaged. 146 In both programs,
mothers of voucher users had slightly more education. 147 Evaluations of
the Milwaukee and Cleveland programs have also found few differences
between voucher students and public school students. On average, parents
of voucher students had lower incomes but more education. 148
140. See Freivogel, supra note 69, at 217.
141. See Difficult Choices, supra note 12, at 29-30 (recommending that magnet programs
give low-income children priority in enrollment, free transportation, and adequate
information).
142. See Gill et al., supra note 76, at 152-55 (reviewing studies on charter school
enrollment); cf Wells et al., supra note 20, at 213-14 (observing that, although many states
have provisions for serving at-risk students in their charter school laws, it is unclear whether
the provisions have much impact on charter school enrollment).
143. See Gill et al., supra note 76, at 143-49; Howell & Peterson, supra note 87, at 60-80.
144. Gill et al., supra note 76, at 156.
145. See Howell & Peterson, supra note 87, at 61-65.
146. See id. at 76-78.
147. See id. at 61, 77.
148. See Gill et al., supra note 76, at 149; Howell & Peterson, supra note 87, at 79.
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On the other hand, skimming may occur if private schools are allowed to
reject children deemed too expensive or difficult to educate. Where
voucher programs do not provide larger vouchers for students with special
needs, emerging evidence indicates that students with disabilities are
underrepresented compared to their percentage in the public school
population. 149 In Cleveland, for example, according to a 1998 parent
survey, 8% of voucher students had learning disabilities, compared to 15%
of Cleveland public school students. 150 Comparisons between voucher
users and decliners in several privately funded voucher programs show
similar disparities. 15 1 In Milwaukee, state law requires voucher schools to
accept all eligible pupils or to select randomly "to ensure that all eligible
pupils, including those with . . . special education needs, have an
opportunity to participate."' 152 But only seven schools enrolling voucher
students in 1998-1999 reported offering special education services; 153 "[i]n
consequence, many students with disabilities surely do not apply."'
154
Under federal law, public schools are required to provide an appropriate
public education for all children and to mainstream them except where
special facilities are needed.' 55 In our view, to ensure that students with
disabilities have equal power to exercise choice, private schools receiving
publicly funded vouchers generally should be required to accept children
with disabilities, with reimbursement for additional costs. 15 6
More broadly, in examining skimming effects, it is important to bear in
mind that current voucher programs, by design, serve severely
149. The evidence also shows underrepresentation of students with disabilities in charter
schools. See Gill et al., supra note 76, at 155.
150. See id. at 150 (citing research by Paul Peterson, William Howell, and Jay Greene).
151. See Howell & Peterson, supra note 87, at 74.
152. Wis. Legislative Audit Bureau, Audit Summary: Milwaukee Parental Choice
Program 9 (2000), available at http://www.legis.state.wi.us/lab/reports/00-2full.pdf (last
visited Sept. 12, 2005).
153. Seeid. at26.
154. Gill et al., supra note 76, at 150. Indeed, only 171 of some 8000 voucher students in
1998-1999 were identified as having special education needs. See Wis. Legislative Audit
Bureau, supra note 152, at 7, 26.
155. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1491 (West
2005).
156. In 2000, Florida established a voucher program exclusively for students with
disabilities (John M. McKay Scholarships for Students with Disabilities) separate from its
regular voucher program (Opportunity Scholarships). See Fla. Stat. § 1002.39 (2005). The
McKay program, under which 9000 students with special needs attended private schools in
2002-2003, provides voucher amounts up to the cost of special education services needed by
each student or the amount of a private school's tuition and fees, whichever is less. Id.
§ 1002.39(6)(b). Early reports indicate that the higher voucher amounts available under the
McKay program have encouraged the participation of many private schools, see Beth
Kormanik, Vouchers Aren't All the Same; Private Schools Prefer McKay Scholarships, Fla.
Times-Union, Aug. 25, 2003, at Al, but has also produced problems of fiscal accountability,
see Lori Horvitz, Cyber High's Operator Again Gets State Money, Orlando Sentinel Trib.,
Mar. 16, 2003, at B1; Kimberly Miller & S.V. Date, Brokers Get Piece of School Vouchers,
Palm Beach Post, Aug. 10, 2003, at IA. In March 2005, Utah enacted a voucher program
for students with disabilities similar to Florida's. See Ronnie Lynn, State's School- Voucher
Program Is Under Way, Salt Lake Trib., Mar. 11, 2005, at B3.
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disadvantaged populations. In 1998-1999, the average family income for
voucher students was $18,750 in Cleveland, $16,000 in Edgewood, and
around $18,000 in Dayton and Washington, D.C. 157 In Cleveland, 70% of
voucher families were headed by single mothers; in Washington, D.C., over
75%.158 Although there seems to be a consistent disparity in educational
level between voucher parents and public school parents (a disparity likely
found in charter schools as well159), the disparity must be put in
perspective. In Edgewood, for example, voucher mothers had an average of
12.0 years of education, compared to 10.8 years for public school
mothers. 160 In Washington, D.C., mothers who won a voucher by lottery
and used it had an average of 12.9 years of education, compared to 12.6
years for mothers who won a voucher but did not use it.161 And in the
nationwide program, only 23% of mothers of voucher applicants had
graduated from college, compared to 20% of mothers eligible to apply. 162
By any measure, the families of voucher students are economically and
educationally disadvantaged, even if they are slightly less disadvantaged
than families of non-voucher students.
To be sure, educational disparities between parents who exercise choice
and parents who do not underscore the need for accessible information and
outreach systems that help a wide range of parents determine and pursue the
best educational options for their children. Because "[a]ll programs of
school choice are more likely to be used by better-informed families,"'163
their design must include measures to provide information on equal terms to
all eligible families. But the broader point we wish to make about selection
effects is that, as long as choice programs remain targeted (as voucher
programs are now), the concept of skimming has limited meaning. At most,
it implicates a distinction between the "disadvantaged" (mothers with 12.0
years of education) and the "very disadvantaged" (mothers with only 10.8
years). As a matter of social policy, we do not routinely reject programs
that help the disadvantaged on the ground that they fail to help the very
disadvantaged. Section 8 housing vouchers, for example, provide their
beneficiaries with opportunities for integrated housing, but do not improve
public housing. The Earned Income Tax Credit helps the working poor, but
does not aid the chronically unemployed. Affirmative action in higher
education generally benefits middle-income minority students, but offers
limited help to low-income minority students in gaining access to college.
Although we recognize the shortcomings and political risks of such
157. See Gill et al., supra note 76, at 144.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 156.
160. See id. at 149.
161. See id. at 148-49.
162. See Howell & Peterson, supra note 87, at 62 tbl.3-1.
163. Gill et al., supra note 76, at 156.
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policies, 164 we support them nonetheless and advocate for additional
policies where they leave off. Our perspective on school choice is similar.
We might have a different view if there were strong indications that
students who remain in low-performing schools not only do not benefit, but
are affirmatively injured when some of their peers choose to go elsewhere.
But the available evidence is thin and reflects conflicting theories on
whether public schools improve or decline when some students have an
option to leave. 165 On one hand, low-performing schools may be harmed
when the most motivated parents decide to enroll their children elsewhere,
although we have seen no evidence that this occurs when disadvantaged
parents exit and leave behind the very disadvantaged. On the other hand,
low-performing schools may be helped if the option to transfer induces
school improvement, although here too the evidence is not clear-cut. 166
In our view, the real risk posed by school vouchers in particular and
school choice in general is not educational but political. Choice has the
potential to help disadvantaged urban children, and we should shape and
support choice policies that best tap that potential. But for one reason or
another, the majority of students in the country will remain in neighborhood
public schools, and school choice does not and will not address their needs.
We should not allow choice to be portrayed either as an anathema to public
education or as a "panacea" that "has the capacity all by itself' to transform
failing schools. 167 It is neither. It is, instead, one piece of the education
reform puzzle. And even as we position that piece to help some inner-city
children leave low-performing schools, we must keep the other pieces in
full view and use them to help the children who remain.
164. Section 8 has been criticized for undermining public housing, the Earned Income
Tax Credit reinforces a distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor, and
affirmative action arguably distracts public attention from efforts to improve K- 12 education.
165. See Gill et al., supra note 76, at 104-11.
166. For an example of a recent study purporting to show that a voucher plan, by giving
parents an option to leave low-performing schools, can stimulate school improvement, see
Jay P. Greene & Marcus A. Winters, Manhattan Inst., When Schools Compete: The Effects
of Vouchers on Florida Public School Achievement (2003), available at
http://www.manhattaninstitute.org/html/ewp_02.htm. However, this study does not
convincingly demonstrate that achievement gains in low-performing schools are properly
attributable to vouchers per se as opposed to the statewide accountability system in which
the voucher plan is embedded. Harvard economist Caroline Hoxby has authored perhaps the
most prominent research showing that competition between school districts and between
public and private schools can have positive effects on public school quality, although her
conclusions too are contested. For a recent review of this literature, see Caroline M. Hoxby,
School Choice and School Competition: Evidence from the United States, 10 Swedish Econ.
Pol'y Rev. 9 (2003); Helen F. Ladd, Comment on Caroline M Hoxby: School Choice and
School Competition: Evidence from the United States, 10 Swedish Econ. Pol'y Rev. 67
(2003).
167. Chubb & Moe, supra note 102, at 217.
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C. Preserving the "Common School"
In providing more choice and diversification in the mechanisms for
educating children, one final concern is that the role of public schools as a
unifying force in American society may be impaired. A traditional view of
public education is that an important objective was to provide the "common
school" where the sons and daughters of mill owners could be educated
along with the sons and daughters of mill hands.
But in the view of many, Horace Mann's commentary on public schools
as the "great equalizer of the conditions of men" and the "balance-wheel of
the social machinery" has always been a romantic one. 168 On the whole,
the public schools have never come close to providing genuinely equal
opportunity for poor or minority schoolchildren. The drive for equality
during the last half of the twentieth century, initiated by Brown and aided
by state court school finance litigation, may have revitalized the idea of the
common school fostering opportunity for all. But during the same period,
many of the gains were being offset by the increasing physical separation of
the rich and the poor. Meanwhile, little progress appears to have been made
in the civic and political education of America's youth, and the revolution
in communications and technology has obliterated the near monopoly that
schools once had as the source for a common culture.
One thing seems certain. As long as political leaders acquiesce in a
system of public education that is largely segregated by race and
socioeconomic status, the aspiration to have public schools serve as
"common schools" will be hollow. An education system that permits
racially and economically exclusive communities to ration access to tax-
supported schools in the name of local control may be regarded as "public"
only in the most formalistic sense of the word. Instead of circling our
wagons in reflexive defense of nominally public schools, more will be
accomplished by finding ways-inside or outside the public school
system-to multiply the numbers of schools serving racially and
socioeconomically diverse student bodies. Our proposals here are an effort
to steer the agenda of school choice toward this important goal.
CONCLUSION
While the obstacles to advancing educational opportunity for children of
color and the poor remain daunting, this is not a time for despair. The
impulse toward equality can be seen in many areas-in efforts to extend
and improve Head Start and other preschool programs for poor children; in
the eagerness of some communities to continue desegregation programs
after their legal obligations have expired; in the readiness of leaders of
education reform to attack the dual system under which less is expected of,
and provided to, poor and minority children than others; in specific
168. Horace Mann, The Republic and the School 87 (Lawrence Cremin ed., 1957).
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legislative and litigation initiatives to provide children in high-poverty
schools with well-qualified teachers and other key resources.
As always, the problems lie in political leadership and will, and in
implementation. Whatever a program is labelled-public school choice,
charter school, or voucher-it will succeed in its mission only if its
admission practices are equitable, if its resources are adequate, if it is
competently and honestly administered, and if it is held accountable for
student progress.
Schools that are diverse by race and income have a track record of
providing that kind of environment for educational success. We need to be
resourceful in finding ways to break the bonds of local control and
residential segregation that have prevented the replication of such school
environments. If we can find the means to do so, we will give content to
Brown's promise of educational equality over its next fifty years.
Notes & Observations
